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Abstract 
 
Baum (2008a) related the number of real estate funds investing in developing economies to simple 
economic and demographic variables, and showed that, while the popularity of markets was 
explained by population and GDP per capita, some countries receive more or less investment than 
the model predicted.  Why is this? 
 
In this paper we undertake a literature review to identify the barriers which inhibit international 
real estate investment.  We test our initial findings by questioning property investment 
professionals through semi-structured interviews.  By doing this we were able to verify our list of 
barriers, identify those barriers which are most likely to affect real estate investors, and to indicate 
whether there are any real estate-specific variables that create barriers which have not received 
any academic attention.  We show that distortions in international capital flows may be explained 
by a combination of these formal and informal barriers.   
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Understanding the Barriers to Real Estate Investment in Developing Economies 
 
1. Introduction: globalisation and investment 
 
Financial globalization has enabled investors to diversify their assets on a worldwide basis, and also 
to direct risk capital to places where productivity and expected returns are high (Quinn, 1997). 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, new technologies facilitated the transfer of funds from 
country to country and improved the internationalisation of assets (Garrett, 2000, Talalay, 2000, 
Sassen, 2006). An increased investor appetite for global investment in equities and bonds, and later 
property, has fuelled this global boom in international institutional investing and has helped to 
push down barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 
 
Figure 1 shows real estate capital flows from source to target country according to data held by 
Real Capital Analytics (RCA) for 2009. The largest flows were from the USA to the UK, and it is clear 
that a small number of highly developed economies dominate this map.  
 
In 2009 the stock of global FDI capital was as much as 21% of global GDP (Lahiri, 2009). In addition, 
FDI and loans (in contrast to shorter term portfolio investments) are the dominant types of 
investment received by many emerging markets (Daude and Fratzscher 2008), and even though the 
benefits of FDI to developing economies are still debated in academic circles (Fernández-Arias and 
Montiel, 1996 and Lahiri, 2009),1 it is both the preferred method of investing in those markets and 
a sign of a country’s attractiveness and growth prospects.  
 
 
                                                          
1 All four issues of volume 18 of the International Review of Economic and Finance (2009), to which Lahiri provides an 
introduction, have been dedicated to the advantages and disadvantages of FDI, particularly in cases where the host 
country is an emerging economy.  
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Figure 1: Real Estate Capital Flows, 2009 
 
Source: Real Capital Analytics 2010 
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In the case of real estate, financial globalisation has helped to create new investment vehicles that 
solved many of the problems that are characteristic of this asset class (Baum, 2008b). International 
or cross-border property investment has boomed, and in parallel with this change indirect property 
investment (investing through securities such as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), and through 
unlisted funds) has become commonplace.   International real estate investment through unlisted 
funds has included 'core' strategies, through which capital has been allocated largely to developed 
markets, and 'opportunity funds', which have also  allocated capital to developing and emerging 
markets (Baum, 2009).    
 
As a result, cross-border property investment grew more quickly than domestic investment over 
the period 2000-2007, as evidenced by various publications by INREV (the Association of Investors 
in Non-Listed Real Estate Vehicles), private research company Property Funds Research (Property 
Funds Research, various) and publications by most firms of leading real estate brokers (for example, 
CB Richard Ellis and Jones Lang LaSalle).    
 
Running in parallel with this development has been a boom in listed real estate markets, especially 
in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) format, and in the number and value of unlisted property 
funds. The growth of the listed REIT market is largely a matter of public record, while investing in 
unlisted real estate vehicles has become an increasingly standard route to attaining international 
real estate exposure.   
 
The globalisation of business activity was, prior to 2007-8, a continuing process, driven both by the 
conversion of ownership of successful companies from domestic to multi-national concerns, and by 
the increasing opportunities offered to corporations and institutional investors and banks to own 
overseas assets through globally-traded stock markets.  The result has been a surge in foreign direct 
investment, with Asia-Pacific a particular beneficiary.  In this region real estate investment (the 
construction of manufacturing facilities, for example) accounted for more than 40% of all foreign 
direct investment in the decade to 2001. Both occupier demand and the ownership of corporate 
real estate facilities have become increasingly driven by the needs of the multi-national enterprise. 
 
European and global cross-border institutional real estate investment also increased in popularity 
throughout the 1990s.  In the City of London, for example, foreign ownership rose from around 4% 
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in the mid 1980s to 45% at 2006 (Lizieri and Kutsch, 2006).  Diversification by institutional investors 
is a powerful driver of this activity, while other investor groups seek higher returns by playing the 
global property cycle.  If returns going forward in a domestic property market are perceived to be 
disappointing, capital will look abroad (Moshirian and Pham, 2000). The rise of international 
benchmarks and improvements in data provision, coupled with globalisation in general and the 
growth of the international investment house in particular, have added to the appeal of 
international investment.  Sheer weight of money drives some funds such as the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority (with estimated assets of around $1tr) to place its investments abroad. 
Others, such as the Government Investment Corporation (GIC) of Singapore, are forced by 
government regulation to invest outside their domestic markets. 
 
Home bias remains an observable phenomenon.  Imazeki and Gallimore (2010), for example, find 
clear evidence of this even in funds of liquid real estate stocks (portfolio investment rather than 
FDI).  They refer to 'barriers' and to 'deadweight costs' inhibiting an optimal diversification strategy.   
A deadweight cost (also known as excess burden or allocative inefficiency) is a loss of economic 
efficiency caused by monopoly pricing, externalities, taxes or subsidies.   This is likely to affect real 
estate FDI much more than it affects portfolio investment. 
Nonetheless, the world’s largest real estate investors have become global investors, albeit relatively 
recently.  According to Property Funds Research data, of the top ten global investors seven have 
global real estate portfolios and the other three have announced plans to invest in global real 
estate for the first time.  It is now unusual among large investors not to have a global property 
strategy.   
 
Currency hedging is, however, expensive and difficult to achieve efficiently (Lizieri, Worzala and 
Johnson, 1998) and vehicles are rarely fully hedged.  This problem leaves investors at the mercy of 
currency movements.  Other perceived difficulties, including the dangers of operating from a 
distance with no local representation, increases the attraction of investing internationally through 
liquid securitised vehicles and unlisted funds, but remain barriers to international exposure by asset 
managers.   
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Two dominant styles of international real estate investment vehicle have emerged since the 1990s, 
driving much of the recent international activity.  These are distinguished by the objective being 
pursued.  The key drivers for investing outside the domestic property market and buying global 
property are the increased opportunities for either or both of (i) diversification and (ii) enhanced 
return.  These potential benefits come at a cost of increased complexity of execution. The 
diversification drive has been characterised by core and core-plus property funds, and the search 
for return by value-added and opportunity funds.  This latter property fund type has commonly 
explored emerging markets.  While some researchers argue the importance of locality amidst the 
globalisation theories (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997, Daniels, 1996, Talalay, 2000, Sassen, 2006), and 
others argue that investment in Western Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim still represent 
the majority in terms of volume of activity (Lizieri, 2009), it is clear from Baum (2008a) that 
property investment in emerging markets, especially by unlisted opportunity funds,  had become 
common prior to the credit crunch of 2007-8.  
 
Investors and fund managers typically allocate capital to regions and countries before selecting 
buildings or funds (Baum, 2009).  The main arguments for country relevance are to do with the way 
data (for example, national government economic growth and inflation statistics) is collected and 
made available, the influence of national regulations, currencies  and taxes, and the interaction 
facilitated by spatial proximity helping to build the trust and rapport which is vital as investors 
gather market information (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997, Agnes, 2000). For these reasons, geography 
still matters for portfolio choice, savings and investment, and can have a great influence on 
investors’ decisions and returns (Stulz, 2005).  Of course, this is even more relevant in international 
real estate investing, as spatial characteristics are a key feature of the asset class. 
 
Some countries attract less capital than others as a result of barriers, both real and perceived. In 
the literature of international trade, gravity equations are widely used to explain bilateral trade 
flows in terms of GDP, distance and other factors that can be considered as barriers, such as 
language, technology and available information between countries (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 
2004;  Portes and Rey 2005, Daude and Fratzscher 2008). However, gravity formulae have their 
shortfalls mainly to do with variables omitted from the model (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003), 
and they do not fully explain asymmetries found in cross-border investment, particularly as they 
relate to developing economies. 
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Geographers argue the relevance of locality and the existence of barriers, and this argument is also 
supported by rudimentary economics.  Markets, costs, competition and government regulation are 
seen as the four pillars of globalisation.  It is argued that foreign direct investment is usually 
attracted to large local markets with good local labour (Daniels, 1996, Case et al., 1999, Hoesli et al, 
2004) and with low entry costs.  Barriers to international investment create costs, both direct and 
indirect. 
 
The production of high quality real estate needs to be financed through large scale equity and debt 
capital.  This is especially required in emerging and developing markets which are short of such real 
estate capital. This requires entrepreneurship represented by equity capital or foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  If actual and perceived barriers to investment influence investor behaviour, then 
large and more advanced economies will dominate real estate FDI, and (given the relevance of real 
estate investment and, especially, real estate development as a driver of economic development in 
emerging markets (Lapoza, 2007), a levelling-out of economic prosperity may be inhibited.  We 
should therefore be concerned to understand the barriers to cross-border real estate investment, 
both real and perceived, for the benefit of investors seeking diversification and return, and for the 
benefit of governments seeking to promote domestic economic development. 
 
This paper is divided into four parts.  Following this introduction, the second part summarises our 
objectives and research method. In the third part we discuss formal and informal barriers to 
international investment, and modify these findings for the real estate market by reference to a set 
of interviews with investors. In the fourth and final section we conclude by summarising the 
barriers that affect real estate FDI and summarise the academic and practitioner views of the 
importance of these barriers.               
 
2. Research objectives and method 
 
Our research is designed  to add to previous studies of investment barriers and to focus this work in 
the context of real estate FDI, and in particular to focus investor’s attitudes towards developing 
economies.  Our aim is to address those barriers and to identify their relevance to investors’ 
decisions in relation to real estate investment (including development as a form of investment) in 
9 
 
developing economies; why some countries receive real estate capital and others do not; how 
investors make their decisions; how much they know about barriers, and in particular which 
barriers they consider more important.   
 
We first undertake a literature review to identify the barriers which inhabit the general world of 
international investment.  We then focus on those barriers that appear particularly relevant to real 
estate.  We set out a classification of the formal barriers that are embedded in the country’s laws 
and regulations and the informal barriers related to political and cultural issues.   
 
We conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with experienced real estate fund managers, lenders 
and investors, largely UK- or USA- based.  We were interested in confronting real estate 
practitioners with academic studies of barriers to general FDI in order to find out which barrie 
rs were considered especially relevant to this asset class.  To do this we used a semi-structured 
questionnaire including a list of barriers drawn from the academic literature and asked 
interviewees to rate them using a scale of 1 to 5, with a score of 1 indicating a low or unimportant 
barrier and a score of 5 indicating a high or important one.  The questionnaire also included 
questions on politics, cultural and geographical issues which were used to prompt illustrations of 
their experiences in emerging markets.  Each interview, which lasted between 40 and 60 minutes, 
was recorded and then transcribed.  We then looked for common themes and average scores, and 
barriers were grouped and ranked.   
 
3. Formal and informal barriers to foreign direct investment: a review 
 
'Push and pull factors' are terms used in economics to explain international capital flows.  Push 
factors can be related to the lack of lending in the investors’ country, while pull factors are related 
to the risk-return relationship in the host country (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999). While push factors 
explain external reasons why investors choose to go abroad or not, pull factors can help to explain 
geographical asymmetries in capital flows. Pull factors include some counter-cyclical policies that 
some countries apply when faced with a surge in the inflow of capital, for example capital controls. 
 
Some countries try to eliminate or lessen the impact of the barriers that are most likely to isolate 
the local market from the global capital market. These barriers have been classified by academic 
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work as formal and informal or direct and indirect barriers. The formal or direct barriers are those 
that primarily affect the ability of foreign investors to invest in emerging markets, for example  in 
the form of taxes and laws; the informal or indirect barriers are those that affect investor’s 
willingness to invest, mainly due to reservations regarding cultural or political issues (Nishiotis, 
2004).  In an investment context, we offer the view that formal barriers are known variables which 
will affect either the ability to invest or the net return delivered; informal barriers represent risks 
which may affect the ability to invest or the net return delivered. 
 
Previous studies have listed barriers affecting the trading of goods, the setting up of companies, the 
openness of the markets or a mix of all. The most important barriers to global equity market 
integration are said to be poor credit ratings, high and variable inflation, exchange rate controls, 
the lack of a high-quality regulatory and accounting framework, the lack of sufficient country funds 
or cross-listed securities, and the limited size of some stock markets (Bekaert, 1995). 
 
While the academic work addressing formal and informal barriers is rich, Eichengreen (2001) 
provides the only overview we have located, although this paper is not intended as a 
comprehensive literature review on the subject. Furthermore only some barriers listed by 
Eichengreen (2001) or Bekaert (1995) affect real estate, which tends to be different from– in 
particular, less liquid than - other investments.  
 
Lahiri defines FDI as “a long-term investment by a non-resident, but with control (a 10% or greater 
share)” (2009, p.1) and explains that there are different types of FDI, ranging from the development 
of new buildings, expansion of existing ones, acquisitions of companies and, in the case of 
multinationals, mergers and relocations. It can be deduced from this that the barriers to investment 
between the parent and host country will be different depending on the type of investment 
contemplated.  For example, tax incentives that a multinational receives for relocating its 
manufacturing plant to a host country have been known to be more substantial than those received 
by an insurance company investing in commercial property in the same country (Lahiri, 2009). On 
the other hand, other costs such as transport and the level of skills of the working population are 
not likely to be  a barrier to real estate investment, but will be a deterrent for producers.  Working 
from this broad overview, we next focus on separating the formal and informal barriers.   
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3.1 Formal barriers 
 
Given our definition of formal barriers, it is clear that they must include restrictions on the removal 
of capital and legal barriers which relate to  the foreign ownership of local assets.  For the purpose 
of our survey we presented a list of all formal barriers drawn from our academic literature review 
that are likely to occur in real estate investments, and asked interviewees to rank them according 
to their importance and how likely they were to deter them from investing in that country.  We also 
asked them to justify their view.  
 
3.1.1 Restrictions to capital accounts 
 
Capital controls affect the ability of investors to repatriate their investment. If domestic savings are 
scarce in the host country, it is likely that capital account transactions will be restricted. A common 
direct restriction could be the imposition of a minimum period of investment (Bekaert, 1995); less 
common are absolute bans on the removal of capital from domestic banks.  It follows from this that 
restrictions on international financial flows are less prevalent in high-income countries with large 
domestic savings (Eichengreen, 2001) and more common in developing economies. Although 
recent research has shown that capital controls do not affect the inflow of FDI (Montiel and 
Reinhart, 1999), our survey shows that real estate investors consider restrictions to capital accounts 
to be a very high barrier indeed.  
 
Among those who gave a high rank to the issue was an experienced global fund manager who used 
to work for a large insurance company and is now founding partner of an investment firm.  He 
explained that some years ago his firm invested in China and decided later to double the 
investment in that country.  Political and legal changes during the period of ownership of the asset 
meant that it unexpectedly took two years to repatriate the capital.    
 
3.1.2 Legal barriers 
 
Legal barriers arise from the different legal status of foreign and domestic investors.  This could be 
in the form of ownership restrictions, which will clearly affect real estate investors  (Bekaert, 1995). 
For example, governments in both developed and developing countries often impose ownership 
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restrictions as a means of ensuring domestic control of local firms, especially those firms that are 
regarded as strategically important to national interests (Eun and Janakiramanan, 1986).   
 
By analysing data from 16 different countries including developed and developing ones, these 
authors explain that even within the same country the fraction of equity that can be held by 
foreigners can be uniform across all firms, can vary across different industries with some industries 
closed to investment by foreigners, or it could be the case that foreign investment is banned from 
the country completely.  
 
The degree to which this restriction applies to real estate ownership varies greatly, and research in 
this area is usually done case by case, given that there are often differences in practice within 
countries as some land is more sensitive to nationalist protectionism.  (A newsworthy and extreme 
example of ownership restrictions affecting real estate is the expropriation of ‘foreign-owned’ land 
in Zimbabwe.)  As explained by one of our interviewees, a lawyer from a prominent international 
firm with experience in the Latin American real estate markets, there are restrictions on ownership 
around coastal areas in Brazil which usually force foreign investors to find a local partner. And this 
is not a problem that is restricted to emerging economies.  A fund manager interviewee recalled 
having to find a local partner in order to acquire a property asset that is was close to a military base 
in Switzerland, where the government had imposed restrictions on foreign owners. The general 
view in our survey is that these types of restrictions can often be solved by finding a local partner.  
For large global investment firms that have offices and are sometimes considered as ‘local’ in more 
than one market this  may  not be a serious issue.  
 
3.1.3 Taxes and costs 
 
The residence principle means that incomes from the foreign and domestic income sources of 
residents of one country are taxed at equal rates, while incomes of non-residents are tax exempt 
(Razin et al 1998). However, as this author explains, this idealised tax structure is often altered, thus 
affecting capital flows.  Counter-cyclical policies mentioned above in the context of control of 
capital accounts (push and pull factors) can also include tax benefits designed to attract foreign 
investment, for example in cases when countries need to increase FDI.  
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Academic studies concentrate on differences in the taxation of capital gains and repatriation of 
capital (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1992). After analysing 18 developing countries, these authors 
conclude that developing countries should promote a policy of lighter taxation on capital gains than 
on repatriation of capital in order to avoid discouraging long term investment.  
 
The costs associated with holding foreign securities in a portfolio include transaction costs, 
information costs and differential taxation.  Researchers have created models that measure the 
impact of these costs on investment. Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) built their analysis based on a 
two-country (domestic/foreign) single period model, taking into account transaction costs, 
information costs and differential taxation. Both models show that the global market portfolio will 
not be efficient for any investor in either country.  Stulz also shows that some foreign securities 
may not be held at all in the domestic investor's portfolio, and Imazeki and Gallimore (2010) find a 
strong domestic bias in funds of real estate securities due to ‘deadweight costs’ and other barriers. 
The academic evidence suggests that high entry costs and taxation are both deterrents to investing 
in a foreign country.   
  
In our survey, however, the majority of interviewees considered costs to be a relatively weak 
barrier to cross-border real estate investment.  In emerging markets in particular, entry costs can 
be compensated for by high expected returns (implying that interviewees expect there to be some 
market inefficiency, otherwise prices would be bid up by locals); and the expected holding period 
for real estate FDI (as opposed to portfolio investment) is sufficiently long for costs to be effectively 
amortised. Interviewees considered this to be a high barrier only where there was no possibility of 
finding a local partner.  
 
3.2 Informal barriers  
 
Informal barriers to international investment arise because of differences in available information, 
accounting standards and investor protection.  There are also risks that are especially important in 
emerging markets such as currency risk, political risk, liquidity risk, economic policy risk and macro-
economic instability (Bekaert and Harvey, 2002, Nishiotis, 2004). Title risk (referred to in Baum, 
2009) is a specific real estate issue that we can add to this group. 
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3.2.1 Political risk 
 
Politics can influence economic decisions and the country’s degree of openness to foreign 
investment. For example, some authors argue that democratic governments are less likely to 
impose capital controls (Brune et al., 2001, Quinn et al., 2001). This is explained by the fact that 
democracy delivers increased civil liberties and improves the citizens’ ability to press for the 
removal of restrictions on their investment options (Eichengreen, 2001).  From these authors it can 
be inferred that investors will be deterred from investing in non-democracies.  
 
In our survey most interviewees considered unattractive political regimes to be a medium to low 
strength barrier to real estate investment.  Among those who gave a medium to low rank to this 
issue was a director of a large UK bank with experience in international lending.  He pointed out 
that dictatorships have the ability to change all the rules completely, and it was supposedly much 
harder for democratic governments “to renege on a certain set of rules that everybody 
understands”. However, he did not consider political regimes to be a high barrier, as he believed 
that authoritarian regimes can be even clearer in their pro-capitalist and pro-investment policies 
than democracies.   
 
A fund manager agreed: “Some authoritarian states can be stable and some democracies – say 
Greece – can prove to be risky”.  However, he agreed with the academic view that (all things equal) 
“you will go for the more stable democratic regime, simply because you are more likely to get a 
reliable legal framework and because democracies by their very nature tend to have less abrupt 
changes in direction.”  
 
Among those who regarded this as a medium rank issue was a fund manager who stated that the 
barriers were not so much related to the political regime as to the legal structure, the attitude of 
the political class to business and economic growth and its attitude to foreign investment.  The 
specific concern expressed was to do with the potential imposition of capital controls.  Another 
investor considered politics a barrier based on his previous experience, stating that he had 
experienced changes of government where new restrictions were imposed that affected property, 
although this can affect domestic investors equally badly. This position reinforces the view that 
economics and demographics (population, wealth and growth) are strong drivers for investment 
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(Baum, 2008) and that informal barriers have relatively little effect where  such drivers exist.  The 
relationship between politics (for example the degree of democratization), financial reforms and 
future economic growth have been widely studied by Quinn (1997, Quinn et al., 2001). 
 
Academic research also highlights the importance of pressure from powerful groups within 
countries.  The most important difference between emerging and developed markets is the much 
more prominent role of politics in emerging markets and their larger public sectors, which can act 
as pressure groups (Bekaert and Harvey, 2002). Pressure groups are at the heart of political 
instability and can add substantial risk premiums to returns and therefore deter foreign investment.  
 
In this regard investors are concerned about groups with government influence.  The head of a US-
based real estate fund that also invests in infrastructure pointed out that this can be an extremely 
politicised area to invest due to the power of lobby groups.  
 
3.2.2 Institutions, the rule of law and corruption 
 
North (1990) distinguishes between formal institutions (laws, rules) and informal behaviour. The 
state is the third party enforcing the law and confronting the trade-offs between disorder, control 
and constitutional liberalism. The author’s main argument is that if political efficiency is 
guaranteed, property rights are respected and economic efficiency can be achieved (North, 1990). 
The ways in which these institutions are constructed vary greatly from country to country 
(Fukuyama, 2004) and the main aim of comparative economics is to study these differences and 
their effect on investment. 
 
To measure this effect, academics have focussed on a range of indicators including political stability 
and political regimes, civic activities and property rights, and corruption. The literature referring to 
the quality of institutions and economic growth is therefore extensive (for a review see Aron, 2000),  
but the most interesting point for the purpose of our study is that academics have been divided in 
terms of the effect that corruption can have on a country’s economy. Some argue that FDI is not 
affected by it, while others point out that corruption deters investment (Aidt, 2009, presents the 
latest discussion of the topic).  
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In our survey the general opinion was that corruption, while damaging, was unavoidable in 
emerging markets; and it seems that some investors are willing to accept a certain degree of 
corruption in order to complete a transaction.  The difficulty lies in quantifying what degree of 
corruption they are willing to accept and how they use middlemen to avoid a direct connection 
with it.  
Corruption is particularly difficult for institutional fund managers who declared, when interviewed,  
that they will not become involved in an economy perceived to be corrupt.  Some interviewees 
pointed out the impact of tightening regulations such as money-laundering controls, but noted that 
these are not globally standardised.  This could be a barrier to entry for countries with weak 
institutions and high levels of corruption. 
 
3.2.3 Economic stability 
 
In capitalist economies, public and private institutions can change or establish new economic rules. 
In other words, they can shape the characteristics of a country (laws, culture, history, politics, 
economics, and so on), how the institutions are shaped and how much the state intervenes affects 
the country’s economic performance, risk and investment (North, 1990).  Even though it seems that 
economic stability is an important factor for investments, some interviewees expressed different 
views: “we cannot control what happens in the market, interest rates and all that, so we tend to 
focus I would say 80% of our efforts on the analysis of the individual asset and not what is going to 
happen to the country or city.”  
 
3.2.4 Currency risk 
 
Currency movements can have a dramatic impact on equity returns for foreign investors. A possible 
irony of international investment is that many developing economies manage to keep exchange 
rate volatility lower than that which is typical in industrial economies. This is not surprising, as many 
developing economies try to peg their exchange rates to the U.S. dollar or to a basket of currencies 
(Bekaert, 1995).  (A critical literature review on currency risk and international real estate 
investment can be found in Sirmans and Worzala, 2003.)  
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Our survey indicated that this is an important risk, and often the main question that an investor 
poses before investing is whether or not is possible to hedge the currency: “If you are somewhere 
like China you can’t really hedge, so, you end up with highly charged debates- this is an important 
matter, you can’t ignore it.  There are hours and hours of discussion about what to do with the 
currencies if you cannot hedge”. Another commented: “This is something that is a key part of the 
business.  We should hedge if we can, because we are property investors and not currency 
specialists.  That will add to costs, and this is a major concern when hedging costs are very high or 
hedging is impossible”. 
 
3.2.5 Liquidity risk 
 
Liquidity risk captures the time it takes to execute trades, other factors such as the direct and 
indirect costs of trading, and risk and uncertainty concerning the timing of selling and the 
achievement of the expected sale price.  The risk that arises from the difficulty of selling an asset is 
important in portfolio investment, but is less commonly referred to in FDI literature.  In real estate 
investment, liquidity risk is generally a more serious issue (IPF, 2004).  
 
Crucial in the issue of liquidity for emerging property markets, especially for opportunity funds 
which try to buy and sell in a short space of time to maximise their (internal rate of) return and 
performance fees or carried interest payments, is the prospective 'take-out'.  Who will buy the 
property when the investor sells it?  Emerging markets are likely to have less well developed local 
institutions and investment funds, and international owners are less likely to be represented, in 
developing or emerging markets.  In addition to potential shortages of equity players ready to buy, 
there may also be a shortage of bank debt.  Local investors may find it hard to raise the cash to buy 
a property if there is no local debt available, and international buyers will often use local debt to 
hedge some currency risk (Baum, 2009), so if debt is unavailable liquidity can disappear.  This is a 
critical problem for a closed ended, limited life unlisted property fund. 
 
Replies to our survey regarding liquidity were diverse, although the majority stated that this was a 
high barrier. Among those was a fund manager who stated that liquidity issues were once more a 
high barrier since the 2008 collapse: “One of the massive casualties of the crash was liquidity.  This 
time last year everybody was desparate for cash”.  For this reason he stated that in the near future 
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“investing institutions will up their proportion of cash, bonds and listed equities, because of liquidity 
issues.”   This suggests a withdrawal from less liquid emerging markets. 
 
Among those who rated liquidity as a medium to low barrier was the head of research of a large 
firm of investors who stated that the importance of this issue differed between property 
developers and  investors.  For the former, lack of liquidity was a problem, but for an investor 
accurately anticipating improvements in the liquidity of an illiquid market can deliver excess 
returns. 
 
3.2.6 Cultural barriers 
 
Despite the empirical research which attempts to price different type of risks, there is some 
evidence that investment decisions are also based on sentiment (Lizieri, 2009). As stated before, 
investors’ behavioural attitudes have been the subject of recent research (Bailey, Kumar, and Ng, 
2004; Graham, Harvey, and Huang, 2004) but further analysis is needed in order to disentangle 
economic bias based on GDP and population stock and flows from the influence of formal and 
informal barriers when it comes to making real estate investment decisions at an international 
level.   
 
Interviewees in our survey all agreed that there were cultural barriers, exemplified when dealing   
with countries with certain religious beliefs.  Even in those cases, however, the general view was 
that there were solutions available such as using specialised lawyers that could make the deal 
compliant with the religious beliefs of the locals.   
 
Sometimes the cultural barrier can be subtle: one of the interviewees was involved in the foreign 
development of a research laboratory which included facilities for animal testing, and said: “in the 
UK we would have never got involved in that but in [X] they didn’t even understand why we were so 
worried about it”.  Others cited difficulties in doing business between between Europe and Asia 
caused by language barriers and the pace at which business is conducted.  Some pointed out the 
fact that making slow progress could be a deliberate negotiation technique used against time-
limited foreign buyers.  
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For others economics and transparency clearly over-ride local culture. Even religion is irrelevant as 
long as the geopolitical situation is stable. While investors say that cultural barriers do not affect 
their decisions, they do state that precedence has an influence in their country of choice:  “I think in 
my business you look at precedence. Historical deal and track records can have an influence on 
people. Some people went to France in the 70s and that went horribly wrong and that stopped other 
English people from coming here for 20 years. The history of deals, what happened to those deals 
and why they went wrong are influential”.  
 
An important cultural factor that was mentioned in the survey but which has not been fully 
reported in academic literature is related to communications, and in particular the language 
barrier, which was related to the level of education in the targeted country and familiarity with a 
culture and language by westerners, especially American and British.  This is important in the 
property world because real estate is not a screen-based, centralised market.  
 
Others considered the history of their own (UK) companies and the way they began to expand, 
stating that their diversification activity started with the former British colonies and expanded from 
there. Real estate is a local business, and negotiations are human activities and not electronic, so 
knowledge of the culture is crucial to build good relationships and achieve transactions. (The policy 
of Westfield, the largest listed property company in the world in 2010, is indicative.  Originally 
Australian, Westfield invested as at 2010 in the US, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand.)   
 
Others mentioned the imperative of building a relationship of trust when a local partner is needed: 
“People don’t see things the same way, and often you are not sure what it is that your money goes 
into, because of cultural misunderstanding, corruption or fraud. I think the human nature side of this 
is terribly important”.  
 
It could be the case that the targeted country has all the conditions for investment but a failure to 
find the right local partner could jeopardise investment. For large funds with offices across the 
world this does not seem to be a problem, and usually the way they branch out is by contacting ex 
patriates in the host country.  If that is not possible, then the usual way is to develop relationships 
with locals over a long time period.  
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3.2.7 Geographical barriers 
 
Some theories contest the inevitability of financial globalisation, claiming that geographical barriers 
remain significant.  The general view expressed in our survey confirmed this to a considerable 
extent.  The ability to visit the country of investment (especially if no visa is required, and time 
differences are minimal) was thought to be a definite advantage.  It was also considered an 
advantage for decision-making.  One interviewee stated that people underestimate how exhausting 
it can be to travel and hold meetings: “you have to manage the distance so that you can go and 
spend a week somewhere, complete the negotiations and come back, because as soon as someone 
knows that you have a plane to catch negotiations slow down, and then you give things away”.  
 
The view of this interviewee was that even when operations are run from a central office in the 
home country of the investor, people still need to visit the target market, as real estate is a "global 
market, local asset".   Others considered that geographical proximity is an important factor mainly 
because people now do not buy on trust: “today people like to know more, and every piece of real 
estate is different so you need to go there [...] people don’t rush to buy things without local due 
diligence, and that slows things down.” 
 
A fund manager from a large investment company stated that proximity helped. Reflecting on the 
way his company invested he pointed out that activity tended to be clustered (US, UK, France 
Germany, and, in Asia Tokyo, Beijing and Hong Kong). He also pointed out that 70% of the global 
real estate market was located in these places, so in his view it was worth creating hubs to 
approximate a local operation. To him the idea of studying possibly 30 countries, and another 30 
legal and tax systems in order, to add an extra 15% to the investment portfolio by value was simply 
not worth the cost.  Others agreed that the market in the host country has to be large enough to be 
worth opening a local hub, as geographical or cultural problems (such as language and time zones) 
are reduced and can be accommodated within the local company   
 
3.2.8 Legal and title risk 
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Our survey showed that the lack of a good legal framework is considered seriously problematic 
among investors.  Confidence in the legal system and the courts is vital for investors if faced with 
any of these barriers “so that if you have a legal wrangle with the government you still have a 
chance of winning”.  China was often mentioned as an example of a country with a complicated 
legal system, and also the place where foreign lawyers are less well accepted than local 
practitioners.  
 
Protection in the case of tenant default and the risk of defective title are other examples of the 
legal risks seen as important by the investors we interviewed.  In cases where tenants default, then 
the different political systems of countries become relevant especially when landlords seek 
enforcement and/or compensation.  As one of our interviewees explained: “In Europe, if your 
tenants don’t pay it can take you months to get them out. In Texas if that happens you go back the 
following week and simply put a padlock on the door.”  
A critical real estate issue is the risk of defective or unenforceable title.  This is an issue in newly 
democratised markets such as the Baltic region and central, eastern and south-eastern Europe, 
where prior claims preceding communist state ownership can complicate acquisitions.   This risk 
can be insured in many cases, but not in all.  In Buenos Aires, for example, methods of piecemeal or 
tiered development can lead to multiple ownership and a scarcity of institutionally acceptable 
single title assets.  This problem is not particular to Buenos Aires; many Latin American cities 
present the problem of ’informal markets’, the gradual populating of land around the peripheries of 
major urban centres that not only lacks infrastructure but also clear legal title (Abramo 2010).  The 
issue of state title 'resumption' has been problematic in Zimbabwe, and adds to the conception of 
title and legal risk associated with political risk.  "Why take this risk or pay excessive costs of due 
diligence or insurance, especially when currency risk is also present, unless prospective returns are 
huge?"  In summary, problems regarding land title are fundamental and mission-critical. Others 
expressed a view that “countries will not attract investment if they have problems with their land, 
legal system, contracts".  
 
4. Conclusions 
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Formal and informal barriers to international investment are important in determining cross-border 
real estate capital flows.  Formal barriers are prevalent in real estate markets because real estate 
ownership is easily regulated, real property is easily taxed and capital controls can be applied to 
real estate assets as easily as they can to any asset type.   This may act to leave domestic investors 
in a better relative position and exclude foreign buyers. 
 
Informal barriers are equally challenging.  The large lot sizes involved in real estate means that 
diversification is less easily achieved (Baum, 2007) and this leaves systematic country risks with 
investors.  Currency and title risks in particular are likely to loom large in investor’s thinking.  In an 
equity portfolio, emerging market currency risk can be diversified; for a real estate investor, this 
may be impossible, meaning that hedging is required, but this can be very costly or even impossible 
to achieve.  
 
The different formal and informal barriers we find to be of likely significance in international real 
estate are listed in Table 1.  This shows that there is a difference in the impact that restrictions to 
capital accounts have on general FDI and on real estate investment.  Real estate investors consider 
this to be a high barrier, and the size of the host market and the opportunity have to be substantial 
to justify taking this risk.  In the case of legal barriers and taxation, however, investors in our survey 
were more inclined to think that these problems have a solution, and the discrepancy between the 
academic papers and the results of our survey highlight the particularities of real estate FDI.  A host 
country could be much more inclined to offer tax and cost benefits to a company that is seeking to 
relocate its manufacturing plant to their country than to a real estate investor.  But even if investors 
agreed that they are ways around formal barriers, they also agreed that the informal ones are much 
more difficult to evaluate and to measure.  
 
 
Table 1: Barriers to Real Estate FDI 
FORMAL 
1 RESTRICTIONS TO CAPITAL ACCOUNTS 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
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Is not affected A high barrier 
    
2- LEGAL BARRIERS 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Equity held by foreigners can be limited, and foreign 
investment may be banned from the country 
completely 
Ownership restrictions are clearly a very high 
barrier, but such restrictions can be overcome by JV 
  
The host country must have a good and reliable 
legal system 
  
Problems with tenants can be difficult to deal with 
in certain countries 
3- TAXATION AND COSTS 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
High taxation of foreign owners is a strong 
deterrent to investing in a foreign country. 
This is not a high barrier as long it is believed tax 
can be compensated for by high post-tax returns 
INFORMAL 
1- POLITICAL RISK 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Investors will be deterred from investing in non-
democracies 
Low barrier if the country has a strong economy and 
acceptable legal framework   
Pressure groups are at the heart of political instability 
and can add substantial risk premiums to returns  
Low barrier, although infrastructure investment can be a 
very politicised area and a problem for developers  
2- INSTITUTIONS, RULE OF LAW AND CORRUPTION 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Perceived corruption deters FDI Medium barrier: corruption deters investors 
3- ECONOMIC STABILITY 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Is an important factor in attracting FDI Medium barrier 
4- CURRENCY RISK 
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GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Currency movements can have a dramatic impact on 
equity returns for foreign investors 
A very high barrier if investors cannot hedge or if the 
cost of hedging is too high 
5- LIQUIDITY RISK 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Not a high barrier in FDI A high barrier  
6- CULTURAL BARRIERS 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Some evidence that investment decisions are based on 
sentiment and cultural issues 
Religion is not a high barrier; language and education are 
important; local partners are helpful 
7- GEOGRAPHICAL BARRIERS 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
Geographical barriers are decreasing 
A medium barrier unless local hubs are used, in which 
case the market must be large   
8- TITLE RISK 
GENERAL FDI REAL ESTATE 
  
A very high barrier: countries will not attract FDI if 
investors have problems with title 
 
 
This paper set out to examine the barriers affecting real estate FDI.  We found three formal and 
eight informal barriers.  We also found that informal barriers are much more difficult to measure 
than the formal ones, and our interviewees consistently expressed the view that there was a 
certain degree of political turmoil, of corruption, of cultural and geographical distance that they 
were willing to accept.   
 
More research is needed to quantify formal and informal barriers as they exist at the individual 
country level, and to use these measures to explain cross-border real estate investment flows.  
 
25 
 
 APENDIX 1 
 
List of Interviewees  
  
Regional Managing Director, Real Estate 
Advisory, EMEA Bank 
Managing Director. European Head of 
Investments Fund Manager 
Real Estate Industry Leader, MENA Consultancy Firm 
Founding Partner. Executive Chairman Fund Manager 
Chairman Real  Estate Consultant 
International Director, Head of European 
Strategy Fund Manager 
President and Chief Executive Officer Real  Estate Consultant 
Head of Real Estate Fund Manager 
Chief Executive Officer Fund Manager 
Chief Executive Officer Fund Manager 
Joint Chief Executive Fund Manager 
Partner Lawyer 
Deputy Chairman Property Company 
Global Advisor Property Research Firm 
Head of Research Fund Manager 
Group Research Director Property Company 
Real Estate Advisor  Wealth Manager 
Head of Strategy Fund Manager 
Chair, Investment Committee Fund Manager 
Chief Investment Officer Fund Manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
References 
 
Abramo, P. (2010): Mercado Informal y la Producción de la Segregación Espacial en América: La 
Ciudad COM-FUSA informal. Unpublished paper presented at the Latin American Real Estate 
Society Conference. Sâo Paulo, September 2010. 
 Agnes, P. (2000): The "End of Geography" in Financial Services? Local Embeddedness and 
Territorialization in the Interest Rate Swaps Industry. Economic Geography, 76, 347-366. 
Aidt, Toke (2009): "Corruption, Institutions and Economic Development" Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 25, 2, pp. 271 - 291. 
Alesian, A. and Tabellini, G. (1989): External debt, capital flight and political risk. Journal of 
International Economics, 27, 199-220. 
Anderson J. and Van Wincoop, E. (2003): "Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle" 
The American Economic Review, 91, 1, pp. 170 - 192. 
Aron, Janine, (2000): "Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence" World Bank Rsearch 
Observer, 15, 1, pp. 99 - 135. 
Baum, A (2007): Managing Specific Risk in Property Portfolios, Property Research Quarterly (NL) Vol 
6 No 2 pp 14-23 
Baum, A (2008a): Unlisted Property Funds: Supplying Capital To Developing Property Markets?  
International Real Estate Research Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, April 
Baum, A. (2008b): The Emergence of Real Estate Funds in Peterson, A. (Ed.) Real Estate Finance: 
Law, Regulation and Practice. London, LexisNexis. 
Baum, A (2009): Commercial Real Estate Investment: A Strategic Approach, Elsevier 
Bekaert, G. (1995): Market Integration and Investment Barriers in Emerging Equity Markets. World 
Bank Econ Rev, 9, 75-107. 
Bekaert, G. and Harvey, C. (2002): Research in emerging markets finance: looking to the future. 
Emerging Markets Review, 3, 429 - 448 
Black, F. (1974): International Capital Market Equilibrium with Investment Barriers. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 1, 4, 337-352. 
Brune, N., Garrett, G., Guisinger, A. and Sorens, J. (2001): The Political Economy of Capital Account 
Liberalization. Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association. San Francisco, 
Department of Political Science, Yale University, Department of Political Science, UCLA. 
Case, B., Goetzmann, W. and Rouwenhorts, K. (1999): Global Real Estate Markets: Cycles and 
Fundamentals. Yale International Centre for Finance. 
Cavailable at Social Science Research Network, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031010.  
Daniels, P. (1996): The Lead Role of Developed Economies, in Daniels, P. and Lever, W. F. (Eds.) The 
Global Economy in Transition. Harlow, Longman. 
27 
 
Daude C. Fratzscher M. (2008): "The Pecking Order of Cross Border Investment" Journal of 
International Economics, 74, 1, pp. 94 - 119 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H. (1992): Barriers to Portfolio Investments in Emerging Stock 
Markets. The World Bank Publications. 
DEichengreen, B. (2001): Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-Country Study Tell Us? The 
World Bank Economic Review, 15, 341 - 365. 
Eun, C. S. and Janakiramanan, S. (1986): A Model of International Asset Pricing with a Constraint on 
the Foreign Equity Ownership. The Journal of Finance, 41, 897-914. 
Fernández-Arias and Montiel, (2001): Reform and Growth in Latin America: All Pain no Gain? IMF 
Staff Papers, 48, 3, 522 - 546.  
Fukuyama, F. (2004): State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, New York, 
Cornell University Press. 
Garmaise, M. and Moskowitz, T. (2004) "Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real 
Estate Markets" The Review of Financial Studies, 17, 2, pp. 405 - 437. 
Garrett, G. (2000): The Causes of Globalization. Comparative Political Studies, 33, 941 - 991. 
Hoesli, M., Lekander, J. and Witkiewicsz, W. (2004): International Evidence on Real Estate as a 
Portfolio Diversifier. Journal of Real Estate Research, 26, 161 - 206. 
Imazeki, T.,  and Gallimore , P.(2010): Domestic and Foreign Bias in Real Estate Mutual Funds, 
Journal of Real Estate Research, 26, 367 - 390. 
INREV (various): www. inrev.org 
IPF (2004): Liquidity in Commercial Property Markets. London. 
Jones Lang LaSalle (2008): Real Estate Transparency Index, London, Jones Lang LaSalle 
Lahiri, S (2009): "Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview of Issues", International Review of 
Economics and Finance, 18, 1, pp. 1-2. 
Lapoza, Steven (2007) The foreign direct investment property model: explaining foreign property 
demand & foreign property capital flows in transitional economies. University of Reading Thesis 
R10036 
Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. (1997): A Phantom State? The De-traditionalisation of Money, The 
International Financial System and International Financial Centres. In Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. 
(Eds.) Money Space. Geographies of Monetaries Transformations. London, Routledge. 
Lizieri, C, Worzala, E and Johnson, R (1998): To Hedge or not to Hedge? London: RICS 
Lizieri, C. and Kutsch, N. (2006): Who Owns the City 2006 - Office Ownership in the City of London. 
Reading: University of Reading and Development Securities plc 
Lizieri, C. (2009): Towers of Capital. Office Markets and International Financial Services, Oxford, 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
28 
 
Montiel P. and Reinhart C. (1999): Do Capital Comtrols and Macroeconomics Policies Influence the 
Volume and Composition of Capital Flows? Evidence from the 1990s. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 18, 4, 619 -635. 
Moshirian, F. and Pham T. (2000): "Determinants of US Real Estate Investment Abroad"  Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management, 10, 1,  pp. 63-72 
Nishiotis, G. P. (2004): Do Indirect Investment Barriers Contribute to Capital Market Segmentation? 
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39, 613-630. 
North, D. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Portes R. and Rey H. (2005):"The Determinants of Cross-border Equity Flows", Journal of 
International Economics 65, pp. 269–296 
Property Funds Research (various): www.propertyfundsresearch.com/publications 
 
Quinn, D. (1997): The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation. The American 
Political Science Review, 91, 531-551. 
Quinn, D., Inclan, C. and Toyoda, M. (2001): How and Where Capital Account Liberalization Leads to 
Economic Growth. Annual APSA Convention. San Francisco, American Political Science 
Association. 
Razin, A.; Sadka E. and Yuen, C. W. (1998) "A Pecking Order of Capital Flows and International Tax 
Principles, Journal of International Economics 44, pp. 45–68 
Real Capital Anaytics, Global Capital Trends, First Quarter 2010. 
Sassen, S. (2006): The Embeddedness of Electronic Markets: The Case of Global Capital Markets, in 
Knorr Cetina, K. and Preda, A. (Eds.) The Sociology of Financial Markets. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Sirmans and Worzala (2003): Investing in International Real Estate Stocks: A Review of the 
Literature. Urban Studies, 40, 5-6, 1081 - 1114. 
Stulz, R. M. (1981): A Model of International Asset Pricing. The Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 4, 
383 - 406. 
Stulz, R. M. (2005): The Limits of Financial Globalization. The Journal of Finance, 60, 1595-1638. 
Talalay, M. (2000): Technology and Globalization: Assessing Patterns of Interaction, in Germain, R. 
(Ed.) Globalization and its Critics, London, Macmillan Press. 
 Thrift, N. J. (1990): The perils of the international financial system, Environment and Planning A 
22:1135-37.  
 
 
